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EYE-BALL’s Human Evil Exposed – John O’Neill (CEO-ARU) … Part 10 – The SBNSW Response …

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Title:
Human Evil Exposed –
John O’Neill (CEO-ARU) … Part 10


Link to all Posted Chapters for –

“Human Evil Exposed – John O’Neill (CEO-ARU)” – The SBS Story

The “Human Evil Exposed” – John O’Neill story link above takes you to a new page where all the chapters to this story are listed and linked.

All the documents that form a part of this story as evidence is linked here. These documents form the evidentiary trail collected as a part of the research undertaken during this project.

The “Human Evil Exposed” – John O’Neill story thus far covers events that took place between 1931 – 1995. The final ending is still to be played out. The motives for what took place in the late 70’s and early 80’s happened in 1931 when the then NSW Government owned – ‘Government Savings Bank of NSW’ was forced to close its doors. This set in motion a number of events that were not resolved until Dec 1987. The motives behind this story are steep in history and these grudges were held for a long time.

After they were finally settled – what then took place culminated in a $75 million FRAUD of public monies carried out by the NSW Government(NSWG) and its agent – The State Bank of NSW – (SBNSW) in 1988.

The players involved and connected with this FRAUD include:

  • Three consecutive NSW Premiers, Wran, Unsworth and Greiner,
  • Several Ministers serving in those Governments and their staffers – one of these Ministers is now a Justice with the NSW Land and Environment Court,
  • Regulatory Departments including the Department of Co-Operatives, Office of Business and Consumer Affairs, and the Australian Association of Permanent Building Societies, (AAPBS) and,
  • Employed State Bank of NSW Executives – the MD was John O’Neill – who all acted in proven ‘conflict of interest’ positions as Directors on the State Building Society Board, and whose intent was to facilitate a FRAUD against the 270,000 SBS members.

It’s a story that crushed the second largest NSW Building Society and at the time it had $1.6 billion in assets, some 270,000 Society members, and 650 SBS staff.

This is a story told by someone who lived through the 87-88 period and is told from his perspective and the evidentiary proof collected from research undertaken to prove the allegations. This story comes from a corrupted base of Corporate greed, corrupt and immoral Director’s, complicit Government representative’s, ego’s driven by historical flawed motive’s, financial market operative’s, drugs, sex, and the brazen Corporate RAPE and THEFT of the $75 million value attached to the State Building Society.

John O’Neill as the MD of the SBNSW destroyed a profitable and functioning Building Society because he could. It was done out of spite and revenge because he lost the 10 year plan to merge the SBS with the SBNSW. In the process he stripped the SBS of its corporate worth and broke all the Corporate and Regulatory rules in doing so. Rules that were put aside by the Administrators charged with the protection of the SBS members and their entitlements. He had help in the NSW Premier Nick Greiner who sanctioned O’Neill’s actions.

The story has many sub-plots and plots within those sub-plots – it is complicated, and to get a full appreciation of these complexities there is much reading to be done.

Please use the comments option below each post for any comments you might want to express – to ask any questions you want clarified – or if you want to make a private comment … please use the e-mail link here – blogcomment@bigpond.com – Enjoy the read …

The EYE-BALL Opinion … [ … where evil lurks – so do friends of the devil … ]

Definitions of Allegations alleged against Mr John O’Neill and his cohorts …

Linked: The Definition of EVIL:

  • morally wrong or bad; immoral; wicked: evil deeds; an evil life.
  • harmful; injurious: evil laws.
  • characterized or accompanied by misfortune or suffering; unfortunate; disastrous: to be fallen on evil days.
  • due to actual or imputed bad conduct or character: an evil reputation.
  • marked by anger, irritability, irascibility, etc.: He is known for his evil disposition.

Linked: Moral Bankruptcy:

  • Definition: the state of being devoid of morality and ethics, used esp. for business and political entities
  • Example: A complete lack of morals is moral bankruptcy.

Linked: Definition of RABID:

  • – irrationally extreme in opinion or practice:
  • – furious or raging; violently intense:
  • Synonyms – zealous, fervent, ardent, fanatical, bigoted.

Linked: Definition of FRAUD:

  • – deceit, trickery, sharp practice, or breach of confidence, perpetrated for profit or to gain some unfair or dishonest advantage.
  • – a particular instance of such deceit or trickery: mail fraud; election frauds.
  • any deception, trickery, or humbug: That diet book is a fraud and a waste of time.
  • a person who makes deceitful pretenses; sham; poseur.

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Part 10 commences … The SBNSW Response …

The stakes in this stand-off were getting serious – Premier Greiner was on record as supporting the SBNSW/SBS merger – his Minister for Business and Consumer Affairs Gerry Peacocke was on the opposite side of the fence.

Minister Peacocke was preparing an Amendment Bill to prevent the merger between the SBNSW and the SBS – this Amendment Bill document was uploaded in Part 2 along with the Attorney Generals – John Dowd – response to Premier Greiner on the ramifications of the Peacocke Amendment Bill.

This was resistance the Premier was not expecting – nor was John O’Neill.  Up to this point whatever O’Neill wanted – O’Neill and his predecessor Nick Whitlam were able to have their Premier make happen.

In the continuing NovelZone Zombie-Leaks uploads – the documents highlighted in this Part 10 cover the period from the 17th May through to the 31st May ’88.     There is also commentary to additional events that took place during this period.

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Below are internal Page links to the SBNSW responses and events that led to the change in plans:

  1. 17th May – Memo to Minister re SBNSW/SBS Merger …
  2. 19th – 31st – May The ticking ‘time-bomb’ explodes …
  3. 19th May – Peacocke’s Amendment Bill …
  4. 20th May – O’Neill sends written response to Registrar’s notice of ‘show cause’ hearing … also requesting a 30 day  adjournment for the Advisory Committee meeting set down for 3rd June …
  5. 20th May – SBNSW appointed Directors sign letters re merger ‘conflict of interest’ …
  6. 20th May – Legal Opinion from Freehill Hollingdale & Page for SBNSW …
  7. 23rd May – Minister memo re unsatisfactory waiver wording …
  8. 24th May – Business and Consumer Affairs response to O’Neill’s 20th May response …
  9. 24th May – SBS Secretary response to Mr Baker’s letter …
  10. 25th May – Attorney General’s -[John Dowd] – advice to Premier Greiner on the Peacocke Amendment Bill …
  11. 26th – 31st May – St George Building Society enter the game with an offer for the SBNSW owned ‘fixed-shares’ …
  12. 30th May – Greiner letter to AAPBS – [G Jack] – re SBNSW/SBS merger letter sent 2nd May …

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17th May: Memo to Minister from Registrar re SBNSW/SBS Merger …

Memo to Minister re SBNSW/SBS Merger Page 1:

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Memo to Minister re SBNSW/SBS Merger Page 2:

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Memo to Minister re SBNSW/SBS Merger Page 3:

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Memo to Minister re SBNSW/SBS Merger Page 4:

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Memo to Minister re SBNSW/SBS Merger Page 5:

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Memo to Minister re SBNSW/SBS Merger Page 6:

Comment:

This internal Co-Operatives Dept internal memo fly’s in the face of everything the SBNSW were trying to implement and were now targeting – and all now within their scope since they had regained control of the SBS Board at the 5th May Board meeting.

Return Index of Events:

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19th – 31st May:   The ‘Ticking Time-Bomb’ explodes  …

You might recall the previous mention of a ‘ticking time-bomb’ awaiting O’Neill is this countdown in previous posts – that bomb went off some time after the 19th May and stopped O’Neill and his agenda in its tracks.  The collateral damage completely derailed the merger agenda and a complete rethink was required.  O’Neill had to go cap in hand back to the Premier and tell him that someone stuffed up.

The damage arose out of the ashes of the 1931 Amalgamation Agreement torn up by the NSWG/SBNSW and the CSB in Dec 1987.

In the victory celebrations, Christmas and New Year –  and the furious forward planning O’Neill had sent his dogs onto – someone forgot to process the Legislation to amend the ‘State Bank Act’.  In its current structure the SBNSW could only operate a Trading Bank operation – and to merge the SBS they had to have the ‘State Bank Act’ amended so as to allow the State Bank to operate a Savings Bank arm.  This meant that in its current form – the SBNSW could not merge with the SBS.

This was a monster of cock-ups … and at the final hurdle in a methodically planned – but still a flawed 12 year plan – and with nobody in second place – the SBNSW fell on their sword at the last hurdle.   This is an example of the style of Bank the SBNSW was – all politics and no real focus on the nitty-gritty stuff that ensure these types of mistakes didn’t happen.

O’Neill was on his knees to Greiner – he had promised Greiner it would all go smoothly when he first courted Greiner’s support when he won Government back in late Mar ’88 – if Greiner was now having second thoughts on the back of Minister Peacocke’s resistance and his proposed Amendment Bill – then he should have listened – but he again backed O’Neill …

By now O’Neill was off his well thought out game-plan – he was making it up as he went along – he couldn’t go back and undo the Cleary and Dennewald sackings – and he couldn’t go forward without Greiner pulling some strings.  This is where the whole saga started to go pear shape and the cover-ups started and only got bigger as they all kept falling off the cliff.

Whether Paul Kearn’s – the SBNSW Legal Counsel made the error or whoever else at the SBNSW is not known. This ‘error’ threw everything into disarray – and on top of that – Greiner’s legal opinion from the Attorney General on Minister Peacocke’s Amendment Bill arrived on the 25th May and inferred that Peacocke’s Amendment Bill would prevent any merger happening between the SBNSW and the SBS.

This opinion was another disappointment for Greiner – his faith in O’Neill and him being able to do what he said he could do had to have been shaken.   Greiner just wanted it to be off his plate – and in that moment his advisory team and strategists all had a brain explosion in how to deal with the problem.

O’Neill was ushered to find out whether he could get Legislation to amend the State Bank Act through in an emergency scenario.

To date he had not endeared himself to the Co-Operatives staff – and this now entailed some humble-pie and ‘egg on face’ posturing to try and get the Legislative staff on side.  There was a female lawyer in the Co-Operatives Dept – J.M. – who was an advisor to the Co-Operatives Minister – she had a sit down meeting with O’Neill to discuss his Legislation requirements and possibilities.  O’Neill was handed a blunt backhander and told in no uncertain terms that Parliament had broken for winter, and he would get no cooperation from the Co-Operatives Dept to push his Legislation requirements.

O’Neill was livid – not so much at the Co-Operatives staff but at himself and the SBNSW staff who got it wrong.

At this point the Illawarra Permanent Building Society had entered the game with an approach to the Premier intimating they were interesting in buying the fixed-capital off the SBNSW – their offer was a serious offer and was fairly targeted at the real value attached to the $3.049m face value of the ‘fixed-capital’ ownership.

But O’Neill was thinking of a much bigger return – he wanted all the SBS retained earnings ($65 million at this stage) – and the ‘good-will’ value attached to the SBS and he convinced his Premier to reject the offer.  The Premier wrote to Mr Jack rejecting his offer.

The story continues …

Return Index of Events:

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19th May:   Minister Peacocke’s Amendment Bill …  this Bill was presented earlier in Part 2 and – [linked here] – but in the context of the flow of events – it is again posted hereto – comment on this Amendment Bill and the Attorney General’s response can be read using this link to Part 2.

Peacocke’s Amendment Bill Cover letter:

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Peacocke’s Amendment Bill Page 1:

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Peacocke’s Amendment Bill Page 2:

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Peacocke’s Amendment Bill Page 3:

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Peacocke’s Amendment Bill Page 4:

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Peacocke’s Amendment Bill Page 5:

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Peacocke’s Amendment Bill Page 6:

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Peacocke’s Amendment Bill Page 7:

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Peacocke’s Amendment Bill Page 8:

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Peacocke’s Amendment Bill Page 9:

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Peacocke’s Amendment Bill Page 10:

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Peacocke’s Amendment Bill Page 11:

Comment:

The Attorney General response to this was uploaded in Par 2 – but can be downloaded using this link

Return Index of Events:

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20th May:  O’Neill’s response to Registrar’s notice of ‘show cause’ hearing …

20th May O’Neill to Baker Page 1:

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20th May O’Neill to Baker Page 2:

Comment:

O’Neill was sticking to his script – he had to have had contingencies in hand to play the Regulatory responses – this letter speaks for the hubris contempt the SBNSW had for due process – O’Neill needed time in the Chairman position to align all he had to do to have all the remaining SBS staff subdued and caged.  The SBS Deputy GM was sent on administrative leave shortly after the May 5th Board meeting – the Head Office staff were well and truly heeled – he was now do the Branch’s and courting their favor.

This back and forth letter exchange with Mr Baker in his role as the Registrar and on the AAPBS Advisory panel – allowed O’Neill to use the system’s process’ to delay his appearance before the Advisory Committee hearing into his ‘conflict of interest’ set down for the 3rd June.

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20th May O’Neill to Baker Page 3:

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20th May O’Neill to Baker Page 4:

Comments:

The above extracts from the ‘special’ 20th May SBS Board meeting make interesting reading – and again point to the hopelessness of the Independents in trying to thwart the SBNSW Directors controlling proceedings.

O’Neill by this stage had to have known he needed a backup plan. All these record of minutes do is confirm the structured and controlled environment the SBNSW was creating – SBS Director Alwyn Thomas was the turncoat – and now he was Chairing all the ‘merger discussion’ committee groups referred to.  The make up of these Committees was included in a letter dated the 1st June and sent to all staff by the new GM – Tony Howarth – that letter is copied below –  [this letter is not a part of the Index return links]

New GM Tony Howarth Letter to SBS General Staff:

Comments:

The committee make-ups in this memo were decided upon way before the 20th May special Board meeting – O’Neill was delaying the public announcement of these Committee structures because he had a lot of other hurdles to overcome during this late May period – his letter dated 20th May speaks of these Committee’s yet they were not made public to the SBS staff until the 1st June.

This memo to staff was all mis-direction – O’Neill knew by now that a merger was impossible due to the State Bank Act not having been amended – but was still giving the illusion to the SBS staff, the media and the Regulatory authorities that he was still pursuing a merger agenda.   This had them all watching ‘left’ whilst his right hand was wheeling and dealing to find ways to still get his hands on the SBS reserves.

There were a number of media reports released during this period – they can be read via the Word and PDF media files uploaded early in this expose – they are again linked below –

Return Index of Events:

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20th May:  SBNSW appointed Directors sign letters re merger ‘conflict of interest’ …

O’Neill Waiver:

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Turner Waiver:

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Kearns Waiver:

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Thomas Waiver:

Comment:

These waiver letters were more ‘duck and weave’ than compliance – because the Regulatory authorities were focused on the ‘merger’ between the SBNSW and SBS – which was O’Neill’s original agenda – these letters address the specifics of a ‘merger’ – and all the while O’Neill knew that the merger was no longer an option –

Now – if the Regulators had of addressed the ‘conflict of interest’ issue head-on and said that the SBNSW appointed SBS Directors could or should not be involved in any decision relating to the SBS and its either –  ‘sale’ or ‘merger’ – with any third party, then the SBNSW appointed Directors would have been ‘dunny-boys’ carrying out the dirty end of a losing strategy …

O’Neill was clever in a ‘Reggie’ style – but clever is not smart – having throw the scent in a direction he knew they would all follow – he set about trying to right the ship and he now needed a buyer of the SBNSW ‘fixed-capital’ that was prepared to pay a price that reflected the true market value of the SBS – and that was where he blundered badly in judgement.

How could he think that he had the right to determine the fate of the SBS without going to the members?   The value of the SBS was not contained within the ‘fixed-capital’ ownership – that was the belief of the SBNSW and as they believed they had structured when the SBS was first formed.  Yet now – the Regulators were not Messes Wran and Sheehan – but a different breed with a different resolve.

This is where integrity will always trump skullduggery – where and why those with criminal intent always trip themselves up – they see the prize and having tasted it – they’ll think they can do anything to get it.  But to do that you have to get into bed with someone who also wants what you have to offer as badly as you do.  That is when Fred Shields from St George Building Society entered the party.

But first – the SBNSW legal opinion they sent to Mr Baker and as part of O’Neill’s 20th May response …

Return Index of Events:

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20th May: Legal Opinion from Freehill Hollingdale & Page for SBNSW …

SBNSW Legal Opinion Cover:

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SBNSW Legal Opinion Page 1:

Comment:

Clause 3 – mentions Rule 7 of the SBS Constitution:  to see a copy of this Rule 7 please – click here – to open the page in a different window – no other comment just information …

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SBNSW Legal Opinion Page 2:

Comment:

Clause 7 in this Legal Opinion above is a most interesting interpretation – where the opinion states –

“… However these 4 Directors are elected by all members (being those holding fixed shares and those members of the public holding with-drawable shares) according to the franchise set out in the rules: see rule 85 especially. …”

…there is some conjecture here – actually more then ‘some’ – … [Rule 85 of the SBS Constitution states – click here – to real rule 85 in a different window.]

This Rule in isolation does not carry or cover what this opinion is trying to convey – be it that they got it horribly wrong to begin with – Rule 80 – Proceedings at Meetings begins and goes through to Rule 90.  These rules are covered through pages 18-20 of the SBS Constitution and are presented below: [opens in a new window.]

Further SBS Rules relating to –

  • Board of Directors – Rule 91 a – 101 – Pages 20-27
  • Proceedings of the Board – Rule 102 – 107 – Pages 27-29
  • Duties and Power of the Board – Rule 108 – 120 – Pages 29-31

… can be read in full by downloading a full copy of the SBS Constitution using these links – [PDF – 12.3mb] – [WORD – 14.5mb]

Not to try and distract from the SBNSW Legal opinion being responded to here – and sent with O’Neill’s 20th May letter to Mr Baker – this opinion has a date stamp on it of 19th May 1988.  [see last page below.]

This seemed a bit odd at the time of discovery – surely O’Neill would have sought outside legal counsel well before this juncture – his in-house legal counsel and fellow SBS Board member – Paul Kearns – had been on this case since the late 70’s.  O’Neill would have worked on the initial CSB setup court case through the late 70’s and would have an understanding of what was being put in place.

Yet – this Freehill Hollingdale and Page Opinion differs from that of the Mallesons Stephens Jaques opinion from the AAPBS, the Solicitor General’s opinion for the Dept Co-Operatives and Business and Consumer Affairs, and the Attorney General’s opinion delivered to Premier Greiner on the 25th May in response to Minister Peacocke’s Amendment Bill on the ‘conflict of interest’ issue.

These three opinions generalising and saying that a ‘conflict of interest’ did exist – stacked up against  the SBNSW’s opinion saying they were sweet and were within their rights to do what they were doing – made for an interesting outcome.   Mr O’Neill must like long-shots in a two-horse race … and Premier Greiner was now involved with a ‘wild-card’ nomination for ‘idiot of the decade’ – The SBNSW wanted it to be so – and badly –  they had been so used to having their own way and having the politicians to carve the pathway – the reality of their creation was not being peeled from the inside out and the SBNSW executive were about to hit the panic button.

The SBNSW Legal Opinion continues …

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SBNSW Legal Opinion Page 3:

Comment:

Mainly history and no issues …

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SBNSW Legal Opinion Page 4:

Comment:

Clause 10 – relating to the Macquarie Bank Report (MBR) – is a fanciful interpretation of the wording contained in the report – it has the SBNSW want and slant but in actual fact the Report played down the merger with the SBNSW – the MBR has been uploaded in the past and can be downloaded using this link in PDF format.

Clause 11 – also goes a bit far in presenting factual commentary – reading the Regulatory Investigation report – click here for a PDF copy of the Investigation Report – these comments seem over stated … the comment – ‘unanimously voted…’ – that is more than splitting hairs and the thing right there is that the Regulatory authorities had the investigation report to refer to when these opinions were expressed in the SBNSW opinion – the SBNSW were feeding their Legal advisers the same pitch they had been telling themselves all along.   Where was their objectivity?

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SBNSW Legal Opinion Page 5:

Comment:

This continuing preamble is setting up the pitch to follow – it is again misdirection and its import and relevance at the time had the Regulators drafting responses that were no longer relevant.

The opinion continues …

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SBNSW Legal Opinion Page 6:

Comment:

Clause 15:  Well … the pitch floats ever so slowly up to and over the plate  … the SBNSW Directors already knew that the merger was off the table …and using the words … ‘merger of the Bank and the Society …’  in its blunt honesty gave them all plausible deniable as to their real intentions, and all happening at the same time in the background and out of sight of the Regulators,  the SBS Independent Directors,  and the SBS members and staff.

The Clause 15 … continues

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SBNSW Legal Opinion Page 7:

Comment:

Read on – this gets better overleaf …

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SBNSW Legal Opinion Page 8:

Comment:

The 2nd paragraph above starting … “A further fact …” … appears to do a complete turn around on the earlier point made that the SBNSW Directors were elected by SBS members – see Clause 7 page 2 – which reads in part …

” … However these 4 Directors are elected by all members (being those holding fixed shares and those members of the public holding with-drawable shares) according to the franchise …  “

Suddenly – the opinion becomes a ‘switch-hitter’ –  the comments …

” … none of the Directors of the Society who hold fixed-shares has been appointed by an instrument in writing served n the society …”

These two clauses talk about the same thing – the second relates to …” … represent the Bank … ‘ and then some other ‘limb’ that nominates sub – s 46 (7) of the Act – …

The 1901 – Building and Cooperatives Societies Act reads in part as follows – click the linked pages below to read this section of the Act.  [Click here for a full download of the 1901 Act]

  • Clause 14-2 – Building and Cooperative Societies Act 1901 – [will open in a new window.]
  • Clause 14-5,6 – Building and Cooperative Societies Act 1901 – [will open in a new window.]
  • Clause 19 – Building and Cooperative Societies Act 1901 – [will open in a new window.]

Clause 14-2 makes it very clear and states in part  –

“… that no disolvement of determination of the Society may be made without obtaining the votes or consent of five-sixths in number and value on the them existing members thereof.”

Clause 19 confirms this in another way … just what this SBNSW opinion was referring to or commenting on in relation to the 1923 Act is further expanded on below:

The Co-Operations Act of 1923 s 46 (7) reads as follows – click the linked pages below to read this section of the Act.  [Click here for a full download of the 1923 Act]

Now – several people with Law experience have looked at these documents and come up with the same opinions as the Attorney General, Solicitor General, and the Independent outside Counsel Mallesons Stephens Jaques – a copy of the Schedule 2 amendment was not obtained.

The opinion continues …

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SBNSW Legal Opinion Page 9:

Comment:

The ‘hinges’ relied upon in the 2nd paragraph are a stretch – given the plan from the late 70’s – and it would be interesting if Freehill Hollingdale and Page had the whole history given to them prior to this opinion – but if they did – then the opinion that they could have acted without a ‘conflict of interest’ defies the total effort to structure the SBS the way it was and just plain logic.

That is to say further – if the Premier and Minister were not concerned with Board Control – why then did they structure the Rules of the SBS in such a way that all the control of the SBS rested with the SBNSW except when SBNSW appointed Directors voted in favour with Independent Directors.  In this scenario – the SBNSW had the right to replace those Directors – i.e the SBS Chairman Ken Dennewald –

There is no legal basis for this opinion to exist and survive upon an opinion that – ‘in serving one master’ – you can also serve the best interests of others whilst serving a second master – and given how things were finalised – the SBS members were given no choice to make a decision on how they wanted to survive after the SBNSW sold its fixed capital.

For example –

  • With a view to remaining independent and as a going concern – the SBS could have purchased the SBNSW fixed-capital at a maximum of one-twentieth of their retained earnings – this would have roughly equated to the face value $3.049 million  …
  • The Society could have been put on the open market  and sold as a going concern – this would have exposed the fixed-capital value openly and prevented the SBNSW doing a behind the scenes deal with St George …
  • The SBS members could have been asked to bid on the fixed-capital shares the SBNSW wanted to sell …

In all scenarios – the members must have the vote – yet the only vote they had was an after the fact deal to rubber stamp approval to merge with St George based on a deal where the SBNSW SBS Directors directed all efforts to the St George deal – much of this will be covered in greater deal in future uploads …

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SBNSW Legal Opinion Page 10:

Comment:

The SBNSW opinion was largely ignored by the Regulatory authorities and given no weight on the Advisory Board hearing to adjudicate on O’Neill serving as Chairman of the SBS whilst holding a Director position on the SBNSW board.

Return Index of Events:

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23rd May: Minister memo re unsatisfactory Director’s Waiver wording …

Minister memo re unsatisfactory Waiver wording:

Comment:

The waiver letters from the SBNSW SBS Directors did not meet with the Minister’s and Registrar’s approval.

Return Index of Events:

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24th May: Business and Consumer Affairs response to O’Neill’s 20th May response …

Business and Consumer Affairs response to O’Neill’s 20th May response:

Business and Consumer Affairs response to O’Neill’s 20th May response:

Comment:

The Registrar sets out the reasons why O’Neill and his fellow Director’s waivers are not acceptable.  This was part of the cat and mouse game O’Neill was engaging in knowing full well that the merger was no longer the game plan.

Return Index of Events:

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24th May: SBS Secretary response to Registrar’s letter …

SBS Secretary response to Registrar’s letter:

Comment:

Rubber stamp stuff …

Return Index of Events:

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20th May: Attorney General’s response to Minister Peacocke’s Amendment Bill …

Attorney General’s response to Minister Peacocke’s Amendment Bill …

Comment:

This letter was previously reproduced in Part 2 of this expose – comments made then –

” …Paragraph (2) clearly gives the Premier reason to question O’Neill’s undertaking and ultimate purpose.  The above legal advice was received some two months after the NSW election – and after a meeting with O’Neill shortly thereafter when the merger agenda between SBNSW and the SBS was first discussed and agreed to by the Premier.   If Greiner was not now concerned at the events unfolding – then his involvement becomes as premeditated as was O’Neill’s purpose.”

This was confirmation that Greiner and O’Neill had to come up with a new plan to get their hands on the SBS retained earnings …

Paragraph 3:  Mr Dowd gives the Premier clear instruction as to the entitlements of the SBS Members – yet in the actions that were to follow – the SBS members were never afforded their entitlements as Mr Dowd so eloquently points out … Greiner helped O’Neill get around the Takeover Review Committee put in place by previous Legislation to protect members – this is clear criminal activity.

This Amendment Bill was listed – but it was never raised – O’Neill backed off the merger and went with O’Neill on a sale to ST George deal – again by passing the SBS members in negotiating this deal on the f$3.049 million fixed-capital ownership,  and not in the interest’s of the $1.6 billion worth of members shares.

Greiner and O’Neill are both tied to this deal … as the evidence highlights.

Return Index of Events:

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19th – 31st May: St George Building Society enter the game …

Comment:

Without evidence to support the timing of when St George entered the game – it is difficult to be precise of when a deal was struck between the SBNSW and St George to purchase the fixed-capital of the SBNSW.  There is no doubt that such a deal existed as at the 1st June 1988 – and evidence of this is contained in the information document handed out to SBS staff and members ahead of the Aug 22nd AGM.  As Clause from this document is produced below.

[Click on image to enlarge in a new window:]

Extract from SBS – St George Merger Letter:

The face value of these shares was $5 – the $118 being paid was the deal struck with St George valuing the purchase at $118*609815= $71,958,170.  The additional interest payment is the clincher – 12.5% from the 1st June – and paid out of the SBS reserves – which in effect meant St George were making the payment.   This amounted to – $3,049,075*12.5% for 83 days = $86,668.91.  This made the total paid for the fixed capital – $71,958,179 + $3,049,075 + $86,669 = $75,093,914.

The telling in this deal was that St George did not want SBS merging with the Illawarra and the Newcastle Building Societies as suggested by the Minister in his review of the Macquarie Bank report.   In fact the Minister warned against a merger with St George indicating that competition if such a merger went ahead would kill the Building Society industry in NSW.

For the $75 million – St George were getting a $1.6 billion loan book and depositor base – there was $65 million in retained earnings taking into the $5 million provision made in the ’88 accounts – and a floating $3 million that disappeared when the accounts were announced and whatever Treasury profits and revaluation adjustment to the Liquids portfolio.  It is known that the liquids were  prime CGS and with the ‘bull’ market continuing – St George made their purchase price back within two years.

It has been advised that the St George Treasurer received a $500k bonus after the SBS merger was finalised – indicating the healthy state of the SBS Liquids.

No to the 1st June backdate of the deal – why would ST George agree to a backdating of the interest component?  The value of $86k is a pittance in the total construct of the deal – but why pay the face value of the fixed-capital and interest on that value unless a ‘deed or arrangement’ was entered into and dependent on the SBS members voting in favour of the St George merger.

This was O’Neill’s ‘get-out’ after he found out the merger could not happen.  This sale to St George was not reviewed by the Takeover Review Board – it was not put to the members before the SBNSW had arranged the deal – other suitors made approaches and were turned away without any due diligence undertaken to establish the worth of the SBS as a going concern – all those decisions were made by the SBS Board  where 4 SBNSW appointed Directors including Messes, O’Neill, Kearns, Thomas, and Turner – and Mr Ian Fraser from July ’88 who replaced O’Neill when he egregiously accepted his fate and resigned from the SBS Board – only a month out from the sale to St George vote.

This was an orchestrated FRAUD – and in the next installments – more evidence will be produced to confirm these allegations.

Return Index of Events:

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24th May: Greiner letter to AAPBS – [G Jack] – re SBNSW/SBS merger letter sent 2nd May …

Greiner letter to AAPBS – [G Jack]:

Comment:

This Greiner response to the Illawarra Permanent Building Society boss and also President NSW branch of the AAPBS – Greiner was telling porkies with this response.  The Attorney General letter was already in on the Peacocke Amendment Bill – the revelation of the State Bank Act not having been amended was also known –  the Government never reviewed with any seriousness  offers that were made.

Return Index of Events:

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Part 11 continues … the SBNSW continues to send the Regulatory authorities on a wild goose chase –  and in doing so O’Neill exposes his ‘winger whinny’ persona when things don’t go his way …

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Link to all previous chapters for –

“Human Evil Exposed – John O’Neill (CEO-ARU)” – The SBS Story

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The EYE-BALL Opinion … Without Prejudice …

  1. Jastinder
    October 11, 2012 at 2:08 am

    This page is somewhat captivating. I am delightful to have found it.

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